When the United States and the USSR were on the brink of nuclear war

New Delhi: Miscalculations, misinformation and misperceptions the fall of 1962 nearly brought the two superpowers of the time, the United States and the USSR, to the brink of nuclear conflict, as the sandy beaches of Cuba became home to a mini-arsenal of Soviet weapons.
It was October 16, 1962, when McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor (NSA) to then US President John F. Kennedy (JFK), entered the White House armed with “evidence” of the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Caribbean island nation had witnessed a revolution a few years earlier that brought communism to the Western Hemisphere.
Bundy’s “evidence” set off alarm bells throughout the Kennedy administration. Any aggressive action could have led to the potential eruption of thermonuclear war not only in the Caribbean but in Berlin or even Turkey, Kennedy warned Adlai E. Stevenson, permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, on October 17.
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It was the height of the Cold War. What followed was the “Cuban Missile Crisis.”
According to the theory, in July 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev made a secret deal with Fidel Castro, the communist revolutionary who led the movement that overthrew the U.S.-backed Cuban government, to place Soviet missiles in the Caribbean country.
Castro had become a larger-than-life figure of anti-Americanism in America’s backyard.
In April 1961, he foiled an attempt by Kennedy to land Cuban exiles in what became known as the “Bay of Pigs Invasion.” While the Americans saw Castro as a threat, Khrushchev saw an opportunity to deploy Soviet missiles right under the United States’ noses.
Over the years, many scholars have pointed out that Khrushchev had multiple reasons for using Cuba as a transit base.
Walt Rostow, economist and former NSA, summarizes these points in his book: The diffusion of powerwhere he refers to it as an attempt by Khrushchev to improve his political prestige, emphasize his importance in the international communist movement, and gain leverage for future negotiations with the anti-Soviet bloc.
Serhii Plokhy notes in his book Nuclear Madness: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis that tThe Americans were unaware of the true extent of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba.
General Anatoly Gribkov, former commander of the Warsaw Pact military forces and one of the main planners of the USSR’s deployment to Cuba, revealed in 1992 at a conference attended by former Kennedy administration official Robert McNamara that the Soviets had managed to deploy 43,000 troops to the Caribbean country by the end of the summer of 1962.
McNamara, JFK’s Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. administration at the time estimated that there were no more than 10,000 Soviet troops on Cuban soil.
Furthermore, according to Plokhy, Gribkov claimed that not only had the USSR supplied Cuba with anti-aircraft weapons, bombers and medium-range missiles capable of striking the United States, but also with tactical nuclear weapons.
Soviet archives refer to the “Cuban Missile Crisis” as the “Caribbean Crisis” of 1962.
The analysis of the Soviet reason for the deployment is based on Khrushchev’s “unofficial but authenticated memories”. The Prime Minister of the USSR recalls that the idea came to him during a visit to Bulgaria in May 1962. It was intensified by the presence of a similar American deployment beyond the Black Sea, in Turkey, the Jupiter missiles.
Read also: How John F. Kennedy hid a quid pro quo deal with the USSR that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis
From Europe to the Caribbean, the Cold War intensifies
In the 13 days since the United States became aware of the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 16, tension in the Oval Office reached a breaking point.
Finally, on October 22, Kennedy went on national television to inform the public of developments in Cuba and his decision for a naval “quarantine.”
It was during this speech that he declared: “Our aim is not the victory of force, but the vindication of right, not peace at the expense of liberty, but both peace and liberty, here in this hemisphere and, we hope, throughout the world.” »
He added: “The path we have chosen for the present is fraught with difficulties, like all paths, but it is most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and with our commitments in the world. The cost of freedom is always high, and Americans have always paid it. And there is one path we will never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.”
After trying to strike a chord with Khrushchev, Kennedy sent the first letter to the Kremlin that same day. In it, he implored the Soviet Prime Minister to defuse the situation and recalled their consensus at a meeting in Vienna. “I did not assume that you or any other sane man would deliberately plunge the world into this nuclear age in a war that clearly no country could win and which could only have catastrophic consequences for the entire world, including the aggressor.”
Khrushchev responded to Kennedy on October 23, calling the U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba an “act of aggression.”
Many miscalculations were to ensue before cooler heads could prevail. At one point, an agitated Kennedy told his advisers that a military offensive against Cuba was necessary.
On October 26, ABC News correspondent John Scali informed the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent who told him that the USS would withdraw its missiles from Cuba, provided the United States did not invade the island. A letter from the Kremlin arrived confirming the validity of this claim, notes the American Office of the Historian.
However, on October 27, a letter from the Kremlin announced the Soviet Union’s expectations for the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Türkiye. “You have placed in Turkey, literally next to us, destructive missile weapons, which you describe as offensive. How then can the recognition of our equal military capabilities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? It is irreconcilable.” Khrushchev stated this in the letter to JFK.
Later that same night, JFKthe brother of Robert Kennedy, then Attorney General of the United States, and Anatoly Dobrynin, then Soviet Ambassador to the United States, held a clandestine meeting. Robert, according to the JFK Library, assured Dobrynin of the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Türkiye during this meeting.
A diplomatic thaw followed. The United States guaranteed that it would not send troops to Cuba and that the Jupiter missiles would be withdrawn. from Türkiye. In exchange, the USSR dismantled its missiles in Cuba. With the crisis averted, the White House and Kremlin also agreed to establish a hotline to facilitate direct communications, known as the “red phone.”
Ankita Thakur is an alumna of ThePrint School of Journalism, currently interning at ThePrint.
(Edited by Amrtansh Arora)
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