How Russia helps China prepare to grasp Taiwan

China is already operating armored vehicles deployable in the air of its Y-20 transport aircraft and, from 2025, has aligned a range of new airborne equipment comparable to Russian equipment. Given that an air maneuver operation for a Russian equipment battalion would require approximately 35 IL-76, while the Plaaf operates a fleet of 26 IL-76, including 10 IL-76 sold For the PRC by the Russians in 2013, one wonders why the APL bought a set of Russian equipment battalions. The fact that contracts include the value of a landing and parachute battalion suggest that the APL plans to obtain the necessary plane or to insert in several phases.

The greatest value of the APL agreement, however, is probably in the training and procedures for commanding and controlling airborne forces, as Russia air forces have combat experience, unlike the APL. The requirement of the equipment of a battalion – with an extended number of C2 platforms – probably speaks of the desire to conduct collective training on a battalion scale, and as the Russians must deliver it, this must be carried out on Russian vehicles.

The agreement also reflects military-industrial cooperation increasing between Russia and the PRC during the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. On the Chinese side, the project is managed by the main direction of the development of armaments and military equipment of the Central Military Council with the participation of PLAAF representatives and the command of the air forces. The Russian side of the agreement is covered by Rosoboronexport, the only state intermediary authorized to export goods, services and military and double -use technologies. But the agreement implies the participation of a range of Russian defense companies, notably PJSC IL (manufacturer of IL-76/78), KBP Instrument Design Bureau (arms systems), Sozvezdiye, United Instrument Corporation Opk and Niissu (Automatic and Communication Control Systems), Kurganmashzavod and SKBM), Armore Universal, (Parachute and landing systems), as well as 27 central research institutes from the Russian Ministry of Defense. On the Chinese side, the implementation is managed by public companies Avic (Aviation), CETC (communication and control systems) and Norinco (armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition).

Historically, Russia is wary of exporting its areas of military-technique to China for fear of theft of intellectual property. However, Moscow is increasingly sees Taiwan’s invasion – and the subsequent division of the world economic order of opposite spheres – as a means of developing the lever effect on Beijing by making Russia a supplier of critical raw materials and military industrial capacity. For China, the financing of Russian military industrial companies contributes to the continuation of fighting in Ukraine, which the RPC supports to fix the capacity of NATO in the European theater. However, China has so far sought to reduce the signing of its manifest defense cooperation with Moscow. The question is whether these contracts represent a change in Beijing’s desire to deepen the direct collaboration of defense.