A federal judge ruled that former insurance attorney Lindsey Halligan was not appointed as acting U.S. attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia and dismissed indictments by former FBI Director James Comey and New York Attorney General Letitia James.
The two rulings by U.S. District Judge Cameron McGowan Currie of South Carolina constitute the most significant legal reprimands yet of the White House’s politically motivated prosecutions of President Donald Trump’s political enemies. Comey was indicted for allegedly lying to Congress and James for alleged mortgage fraud, but both cases were widely seen by legal experts as flimsy and pretenseful.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
In an ironic historical twist, Currie cited U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon’s opinion to dismiss Mar-a-Lago’s indictment against Trump on the grounds that Jack Smith was illegally appointed special counsel in violation of the Appointments Clause.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
In an ironic historical twist, Currie cited U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon’s opinion to dismiss Mar-a-Lago’s indictment against Trump on the grounds that Jack Smith was illegally appointed special counsel in violation of the Appointments Clause.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
Beyond a simple violation of the law, Currie concluded that Halligan’s invalid appointment also violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Halligan was neither confirmed by the Senate nor through a congressionally authorized process, Currie concluded. His illegal appointment rendered all of Halligan’s alleged acts void as the U.S. Attorney ruled, Currie ruled, which was his basis for dismissing the indictments, which were never valid:
I find that all actions arising out of Ms. Halligan’s defective appointment, including obtaining and signing [the] the indictment, constitute illegal exercises of executive power and must be quashed.
In an ironic historical twist, Currie cited U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon’s opinion to dismiss Mar-a-Lago’s indictment against Trump on the grounds that Jack Smith was illegally appointed special counsel in violation of the Appointments Clause.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
In Halligan’s case, Trump removed former acting U.S. Attorney Erik Siebert because he failed to pursue the politicized prosecution the president demanded. Siebert’s initial 120-day term as acting U.S. attorney appointed by Attorney General Pam Bondi had already expired, but his term was extended by district judges. When Bondi purported to appoint Halligan to replace Siebert, it sparked a conflict over who had the authority to appoint interim attorneys beyond 120 days.
Beyond a simple violation of the law, Currie concluded that Halligan’s invalid appointment also violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Halligan was neither confirmed by the Senate nor through a congressionally authorized process, Currie concluded. His illegal appointment rendered all of Halligan’s alleged acts void as the U.S. Attorney ruled, Currie ruled, which was his basis for dismissing the indictments, which were never valid:
I find that all actions arising out of Ms. Halligan’s defective appointment, including obtaining and signing [the] the indictment, constitute illegal exercises of executive power and must be quashed.
In an ironic historical twist, Currie cited U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon’s opinion to dismiss Mar-a-Lago’s indictment against Trump on the grounds that Jack Smith was illegally appointed special counsel in violation of the Appointments Clause.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
In Halligan’s case, Trump removed former acting U.S. Attorney Erik Siebert because he failed to pursue the politicized prosecution the president demanded. Siebert’s initial 120-day term as acting U.S. attorney appointed by Attorney General Pam Bondi had already expired, but his term was extended by district judges. When Bondi purported to appoint Halligan to replace Siebert, it sparked a conflict over who had the authority to appoint interim attorneys beyond 120 days.
Beyond a simple violation of the law, Currie concluded that Halligan’s invalid appointment also violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Halligan was neither confirmed by the Senate nor through a congressionally authorized process, Currie concluded. His illegal appointment rendered all of Halligan’s alleged acts void as the U.S. Attorney ruled, Currie ruled, which was his basis for dismissing the indictments, which were never valid:
I find that all actions arising out of Ms. Halligan’s defective appointment, including obtaining and signing [the] the indictment, constitute illegal exercises of executive power and must be quashed.
In an ironic historical twist, Currie cited U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon’s opinion to dismiss Mar-a-Lago’s indictment against Trump on the grounds that Jack Smith was illegally appointed special counsel in violation of the Appointments Clause.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
The Trump administration argued — contrary to established law and past practice — that the attorney general could appoint consecutive acting U.S. attorneys to their own 120-day terms indefinitely. After analyzing U.S. attorney vacancy law, Currie rejected this argument, using identical language in both decisions:
In summary, the text, structure, and history of Section 546 lead to one conclusion: The Attorney General’s authority to appoint an Acting U.S. Attorney lasts a total of 120 days from the date he or she first invokes Section 546 following the departure of a Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney. If the position remains vacant at the end of the 120-day period, the exclusive authority to make further acting appointments under the law transfers to the district court, where it remains until the President’s appointment is confirmed by the Senate.
In Halligan’s case, Trump removed former acting U.S. Attorney Erik Siebert because he failed to pursue the politicized prosecution the president demanded. Siebert’s initial 120-day term as acting U.S. attorney appointed by Attorney General Pam Bondi had already expired, but his term was extended by district judges. When Bondi purported to appoint Halligan to replace Siebert, it sparked a conflict over who had the authority to appoint interim attorneys beyond 120 days.
Beyond a simple violation of the law, Currie concluded that Halligan’s invalid appointment also violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Halligan was neither confirmed by the Senate nor through a congressionally authorized process, Currie concluded. His illegal appointment rendered all of Halligan’s alleged acts void as the U.S. Attorney ruled, Currie ruled, which was his basis for dismissing the indictments, which were never valid:
I find that all actions arising out of Ms. Halligan’s defective appointment, including obtaining and signing [the] the indictment, constitute illegal exercises of executive power and must be quashed.
In an ironic historical twist, Currie cited U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon’s opinion to dismiss Mar-a-Lago’s indictment against Trump on the grounds that Jack Smith was illegally appointed special counsel in violation of the Appointments Clause.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
Judge Currie was appointed to hear Comey and James’ challenges to Halligan’s nomination due to a conflict of interest among the district’s federal judges. One of the main questions raised by the challenge to Halligan’s appointment was whether the attorney general or judges in that district had the authority to appoint acting U.S. attorneys after an initial 120-day term expired.
The Trump administration argued — contrary to established law and past practice — that the attorney general could appoint consecutive acting U.S. attorneys to their own 120-day terms indefinitely. After analyzing U.S. attorney vacancy law, Currie rejected this argument, using identical language in both decisions:
In summary, the text, structure, and history of Section 546 lead to one conclusion: The Attorney General’s authority to appoint an Acting U.S. Attorney lasts a total of 120 days from the date he or she first invokes Section 546 following the departure of a Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney. If the position remains vacant at the end of the 120-day period, the exclusive authority to make further acting appointments under the law transfers to the district court, where it remains until the President’s appointment is confirmed by the Senate.
In Halligan’s case, Trump removed former acting U.S. Attorney Erik Siebert because he failed to pursue the politicized prosecution the president demanded. Siebert’s initial 120-day term as acting U.S. attorney appointed by Attorney General Pam Bondi had already expired, but his term was extended by district judges. When Bondi purported to appoint Halligan to replace Siebert, it sparked a conflict over who had the authority to appoint interim attorneys beyond 120 days.
Beyond a simple violation of the law, Currie concluded that Halligan’s invalid appointment also violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Halligan was neither confirmed by the Senate nor through a congressionally authorized process, Currie concluded. His illegal appointment rendered all of Halligan’s alleged acts void as the U.S. Attorney ruled, Currie ruled, which was his basis for dismissing the indictments, which were never valid:
I find that all actions arising out of Ms. Halligan’s defective appointment, including obtaining and signing [the] the indictment, constitute illegal exercises of executive power and must be quashed.
In an ironic historical twist, Currie cited U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon’s opinion to dismiss Mar-a-Lago’s indictment against Trump on the grounds that Jack Smith was illegally appointed special counsel in violation of the Appointments Clause.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
Both indictments were dismissed without prejudice, meaning in theory the government can obtain new indictments. But in the Comey case, the statute of limitations has since expired, which could prevent the government from re-indicting him on those charges. Although Currie’s decision does not explicitly state that Comey cannot be re-indicted, it strongly suggests that the expired statute of limitations would serve as a barrier to re-indictment.
Judge Currie was appointed to hear Comey and James’ challenges to Halligan’s nomination due to a conflict of interest among the district’s federal judges. One of the main questions raised by the challenge to Halligan’s appointment was whether the attorney general or judges in that district had the authority to appoint acting U.S. attorneys after an initial 120-day term expired.
The Trump administration argued — contrary to established law and past practice — that the attorney general could appoint consecutive acting U.S. attorneys to their own 120-day terms indefinitely. After analyzing U.S. attorney vacancy law, Currie rejected this argument, using identical language in both decisions:
In summary, the text, structure, and history of Section 546 lead to one conclusion: The Attorney General’s authority to appoint an Acting U.S. Attorney lasts a total of 120 days from the date he or she first invokes Section 546 following the departure of a Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney. If the position remains vacant at the end of the 120-day period, the exclusive authority to make further acting appointments under the law transfers to the district court, where it remains until the President’s appointment is confirmed by the Senate.
In Halligan’s case, Trump removed former acting U.S. Attorney Erik Siebert because he failed to pursue the politicized prosecution the president demanded. Siebert’s initial 120-day term as acting U.S. attorney appointed by Attorney General Pam Bondi had already expired, but his term was extended by district judges. When Bondi purported to appoint Halligan to replace Siebert, it sparked a conflict over who had the authority to appoint interim attorneys beyond 120 days.
Beyond a simple violation of the law, Currie concluded that Halligan’s invalid appointment also violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Halligan was neither confirmed by the Senate nor through a congressionally authorized process, Currie concluded. His illegal appointment rendered all of Halligan’s alleged acts void as the U.S. Attorney ruled, Currie ruled, which was his basis for dismissing the indictments, which were never valid:
I find that all actions arising out of Ms. Halligan’s defective appointment, including obtaining and signing [the] the indictment, constitute illegal exercises of executive power and must be quashed.
In an ironic historical twist, Currie cited U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon’s opinion to dismiss Mar-a-Lago’s indictment against Trump on the grounds that Jack Smith was illegally appointed special counsel in violation of the Appointments Clause.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
Both indictments were dismissed without prejudice, meaning in theory the government can obtain new indictments. But in the Comey case, the statute of limitations has since expired, which could prevent the government from re-indicting him on those charges. Although Currie’s decision does not explicitly state that Comey cannot be re-indicted, it strongly suggests that the expired statute of limitations would serve as a barrier to re-indictment.
Judge Currie was appointed to hear Comey and James’ challenges to Halligan’s nomination due to a conflict of interest among the district’s federal judges. One of the main questions raised by the challenge to Halligan’s appointment was whether the attorney general or judges in that district had the authority to appoint acting U.S. attorneys after an initial 120-day term expired.
The Trump administration argued — contrary to established law and past practice — that the attorney general could appoint consecutive acting U.S. attorneys to their own 120-day terms indefinitely. After analyzing U.S. attorney vacancy law, Currie rejected this argument, using identical language in both decisions:
In summary, the text, structure, and history of Section 546 lead to one conclusion: The Attorney General’s authority to appoint an Acting U.S. Attorney lasts a total of 120 days from the date he or she first invokes Section 546 following the departure of a Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney. If the position remains vacant at the end of the 120-day period, the exclusive authority to make further acting appointments under the law transfers to the district court, where it remains until the President’s appointment is confirmed by the Senate.
In Halligan’s case, Trump removed former acting U.S. Attorney Erik Siebert because he failed to pursue the politicized prosecution the president demanded. Siebert’s initial 120-day term as acting U.S. attorney appointed by Attorney General Pam Bondi had already expired, but his term was extended by district judges. When Bondi purported to appoint Halligan to replace Siebert, it sparked a conflict over who had the authority to appoint interim attorneys beyond 120 days.
Beyond a simple violation of the law, Currie concluded that Halligan’s invalid appointment also violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Halligan was neither confirmed by the Senate nor through a congressionally authorized process, Currie concluded. His illegal appointment rendered all of Halligan’s alleged acts void as the U.S. Attorney ruled, Currie ruled, which was his basis for dismissing the indictments, which were never valid:
I find that all actions arising out of Ms. Halligan’s defective appointment, including obtaining and signing [the] the indictment, constitute illegal exercises of executive power and must be quashed.
In an ironic historical twist, Currie cited U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon’s opinion to dismiss Mar-a-Lago’s indictment against Trump on the grounds that Jack Smith was illegally appointed special counsel in violation of the Appointments Clause.
In ruling against the Trump administration, Currie also rejected Bondi’s clumsy attempts to retroactively ratify Halligan’s appointment by, among other things, appointing her as special counsel:
I reject the Attorney General’s attempt to retroactively confer special prosecutor status on Ms. Halligan. Regardless of what the Attorney General “intended”…or “could have” done, the fact remains that Ms. Halligan was not a “legally authorized attorney” to conduct grand jury proceedings when she obtained Mr. Comey’s indictment.
After dismissing several of the Trump administration’s more tenuous arguments, Currie focused on Bondi’s attempt to ratify Halligan’s alleged actions as acting U.S. attorney as a last-ditch effort to save the president’s long-sought indictments. Bondi’s ratification attempt failed, Currie said, because Halligan was not a government attorney in any capacity at the time she presented the indictments — and to rule otherwise would yield absurd results:
The implications of a contrary conclusion are extraordinary. That would mean the government could send any citizen off the street — lawyer or not — into the grand jury room to obtain an indictment, provided the attorney general gives approval after the fact. This cannot be the law.
At this point, Currie’s rulings in the two cases diverge slightly due to the statute of limitations issue in the Comey case. The administration rushed to indict Comey before the statute of limitations expired, and the statute of limitations actually expired after Comey was allegedly indicted and before Bondi attempted to ratify Halligan’s work. Currie ruled that because the statute of limitations had already expired, Bondi did not have the authority to ratify something that she no longer had the authority to do herself.
Although Currie dismissed both indictments without prejudice — meaning the charges can be refiled — a footnote in the Comey decision suggests Currie might think he is immune from further prosecution. She cites case law that says the statute of limitations stops running once an indictment is returned, meaning that in theory Comey could be charged again, but not when the original indictment was invalid. “[I]If the prior indictment is void, there is no legitimate peg on which to hang such a result that imposes judicial limits,” Currie cited in another case.
In both cases, Currie found the question of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice to be fairly easy to resolve. Case law, she said, ordered her to restore Comey and James to the positions they held before Halligan’s invalid indictments.
It’s the third time federal judges have concluded that acting U.S. attorneys were not appointed invalid during Trump’s second term, echoing similar rulings in New Jersey and Nevada.
At the time of Currie’s dismissal of their cases, Comey and James both had several other motions pending to dismiss their indictments, based on substantial legal and factual grounds, including allegations of vindictive prosecution. Comey also vigorously disputed whether his indictment had ever been voted on by the grand jury, after Halligan made a hash of the grand jury proceedings. But Currie was asked only to focus on the preliminary question of whether Halligan had been properly appointed.
If new indictments are filed, Lindsey Halligan will not be the prosecutor, and whoever is will not have been appointed by Bondi.
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