Political affairs: Avigdor Liberman’s balancing act between Russian immigrants and a national platform faces new tests following the 2022 migration wave.
In 2022, when Russia War with Ukraine sent tens of thousands of new immigrants to Israel, Avigdor Liberman, chief of Yisrael Beyté, published a declaration that made mixed reactions from Russian and Ukrainian interest groups. “I am not for Russia, I am not for Ukraine, I am for Israel,” he said.
The remark came at a time of political change outside and inside his party. This has put the spotlight on its long -standing balance between ethnic policy and national concerns.
Since its foundation in 1999, Yisrael Beyté has been more than a political party. He was the main representative of the Israeli Russian -speaking community, supported by Israeli voters immigrants from the former countries of the Soviet Union (FSU).
While other “Russian” parties have disappeared, Yisrael Beyté “survived and prospered”, according to Larissa Remennick, professor of sociology and anthropology at Bar-Ilan University. For years, the party has obtained a notable part of Russian -speaking votes, often eclipping Likoud among this group.
The political scientist Ze’ev Khanin calls the formula of Yisrael Beyté a “national sectoral” identity – a “Russian party with an Israeli accent”. Liberman has woven specific concerns to the FSU immigrant group to a broader national discourse, appealing both to its base and the broader electorate.
The president of Yisrael Beyté, MK Avigdor Liberman, speaks to the Knesset, in Jerusalem, Israel, June 9, 2025 (Credit: Chen Shimmel / The Jerusalem Post)
But Sergei Poliak, a political analyst, argues that this balance still fundamentally depends on the migration cycle. “Liberman exists and develops as a party solely thanks to returnees from Russian-speaking FSU countries,” he said. In its opinion, party growth directly follows immigration flows: “If you create a correlation … then you will see that the growth of mandates for Liberman will certainly be correlated with the tributary of Russia repatriates.”
The strength and weakness of Yisrael Beyté
According to some criticisms, “the Russian accent” of Yisrael Beyté is both his asset and his weakness. Many in the FSU community see “one of their own” in the direction of Liberman, while the veteran Israelis often express suspicion of the Russian party’s imprint. In 2019, the journalist Lily Galili described the next Liberman challenge: “strengthen the national dimension of [his] party without losing its Russian base. »»
Quick advance to the post-2022 migration wave, the arrival of nearly 100,000 Russian immigrants puts this balance to the test. Many newcomers arrive with urgent needs – housing, jobs and navigate life in Israel – yet Liberman has refrained from explicitly high -level mentions in favor of these new Olim.
For Khanin, the fundamentals remain unchanged: “Liberman still represents an internal policy position which resonates with the returnees of the 90s, the 2000s and the 2020s”. In a recent article for the Begin-Sadat Center, he argued that the Soviet and post-Soviet heritage has “less than Israeli experience, unlike stereotypes”.
In all Aliyah’s waves, he says that Russian-speaking immigrants have largely “integrated into Israeli society and have adopted its dominant values and political beliefs”, which means that their interests are not significantly different from those of the general electorate. However, they present their own vision in the way of solving not only community -focused problems, but also national problems.
The biggest change, notes Khanin, is part of the national agenda itself. “Yes, say, 14-15 years ago [the agenda] was above all a left right fracture, now, as we see with the exhaustion of the Arab-Israeli conflict in its conventional form as the main subject, the accent is placed on civil and economic issues. “This change aligns perfectly with Liberman’s priorities:” The big problem inside the wider camp – the central camp is the idea of Israel as a Jewish Democrat – while “Jew” means national rather than religious. “
Poliak complicates this image. Although it should be older immigrants remain a stable block of voting, he underlines the generational turnover: “For some people, it works forever … They will vote for Yisrael Beyté until the end of their days. And the youngest will pick up the Hebrew faster … in two to three years, relatively quickly, they will determine what is what is going, and they are starting to vote quite consciously. ”
Where Khanin sees continuity through decades of Aliyah, Poliak suggests potential changes in the Liberman electorate while young voters assimilate more quickly and change their loyalty.
The national concerns of Liberman do not indicate a departure from his electorate supported by the FSU; For example, Poliak stresses that “the influx of migrants does not create an imbalance between [Israel’s] Interest and interest of Liberman. However, as its platform focuses more on broader national concerns, the question is twofold: if the “ethnic” aspect of politics is still in demand and if parts like Yisrael Beyté will continue to be with it.
Khanin thinks that Israeli identity is defined by “postmodernism and multiculturalism” – being Israeli means belonging to the nation while identifying with a subgroup that distinguishes a community from another. Basically, it is the balance that parties like Yisrael Beyté seek to find. Faced with criticism accusing Liberman of the “separation society” – which Khanin considers “without any idea of Israeli political sociology, propagandists or provocateurs” – Yisrael Beyté plays a double role: a national actor with a sectoral border.
However, Poliak’s warning suggests that this double role can be less lasting than it seems, considering changing generational voting models. While older returnees remain faithful but the young generations integrate more quickly, the party niche could shrink over time. Yisrael Beyté therefore stands at an uncertain intersection: supported by immigration flows, but tested by assimilation and national changes.
