As the aircraft carrier USS Gerald Ford heads to the Caribbean, the US military continues to strike drug boats off the coast of Venezuela and against the Trump administration. debates about what to do About Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, one thing seems certain: Venezuela and the Western Hemisphere would be better off if Maduro packed his bags and spent his remaining years in exile.
This is certainly what Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado is working towards. This year’s Nobel Prize winner has spent much of his time recently in the United States lobbying policymakers to force Maduro from power. Constantly threatened with detention in her own country, Machado is give interviews and participating in conferences to advocate for regime change. His arguments are clearly tailored to the Trump administration: Maduro is the head of a drug cartel that is poisoning Americans; his dictatorship rests on weak pillars; and the forces of democracy in Venezuela are fully prepared to take over once Maduro is gone. “We are ready to take power,” Machado said Bloomberg News in an October interview.
But as the old saying goes, if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. While there is no doubt that Maduro is a despot and an election-stealing fraudster, American policymakers cannot simply take what Machado says for granted. Washington learned this the hard way in the run-up to the Iraq War, when an opposition leader named Ahmed Chalabi argued to American policymakers that rebuilding a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would be painless. We all know how the story played out: The United States encountered an occupation that absorbed its resources, triggered unintended regional consequences, and proved more difficult than its proponents initially claimed.
To be honest, Machado is not Chalabi. The latter was a fraudster; the first is at the head of an opposition movement whose candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, won two thirds of the votes during the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election (Maduro still claimed victory and forced González into exile). But just because his motives are good doesn’t mean we shouldn’t question his claims.
Will regime change in Caracas produce the Western-style democracy Machado and his supporters expect? None of us can rule it out. But the Trump administration cannot count on this as the outcome of a post-Maduro future. Other scenarios are just as likely, if not more so — and some of them could lead to greater violence for Venezuelans and more problems for U.S. policy in Latin America.
The big problem with regime change is that you can never be entirely sure what will happen after the outgoing leader leaves office. Such operations are inherently dangerous and destabilizing; political orders are deliberately broken, the haves have become have-nots, and groups accustomed to holding the reins of power suddenly find themselves excluded. When Hussein was deposed in Iraq, military officers, Ba’ath Party loyalists and courtiers of the regime that had dominated the country for nearly a quarter of a century were forced to make do with an entirely new situation. The Sunni-dominated structure was overthrown and members of the Shia majority, previously oppressed, were now enthusiastically taking their place at the top of the system. This, combined with the U.S. decision to ban anyone associated with the old regime from holding state positions, fueled the ingredients of a large-scale insurgency that challenged the new government, precipitated a civil war and killed tens of thousands of Iraqis.
Regime change can also create a complete absence of authority, as was the case in Libya after the US and NATO intervention in 2011. Much like Maduro today, Muammar Kadafi was a reviled figure whose demise was supposed to pave the way for a democratic utopia in North Africa. The reality was anything but. Instead, Gaddafi’s departure has sparked conflict between Libya’s main tribal alliances, competing governments and the proliferation of terrorist groups in a country just south of the European Union. Fifteen years later, Libya remains a basket case of militias, warlords and weak institutions.
Unlike Iraq and Libya, Venezuela has experience with democratic governance. It has held relatively free and fair elections in the past and does not suffer from the types of sectarian divisions associated with Middle Eastern states.
This is, however, little comfort to those expecting a democratic transition. Indeed, for such a transition to succeed, the Venezuelan military would have to get on board, either by standing aside during the collapse of Maduro’s regime, actively arresting Maduro and his key associates, or by agreeing to transfer its support to the new authorities. But again, this is a daunting challenge, especially for a military whose leadership is a critical aspect of the Maduro regime’s survival, which has become accustomed to earning obscene amounts of money through clandestine illegal activities, and whose members are implicated in human rights abuses. The same elites who benefited greatly from the old system should cooperate with the new one. This seems unlikely, especially if their share of the pie will shrink when Maduro leaves.
Finally, while regime change may seem like a good remedy to Venezuela’s problem, it could only worsen the difficulties over time. Although the Maduro regime’s mandate is already limited, its complete dissolution could set the stage for a fight between elements of the former government, drug trafficking organizations and established armed groups like the Colombian National Liberation Army, which has long treated Venezuela as a base of operations. Any post-Maduro government would struggle to manage all of this even as it attempts to restructure Venezuela’s economy and rebuild its institutions. The Trump administration would then face the prospect of Venezuela becoming an even bigger source of drugs and migration, precisely what the White House is working to prevent.
Ultimately, María Corina Machado might be right. But she offers an optimistic hypothesis. The United States should not believe this. Democracy after Maduro is possible, but it is not the only possible outcome – and it is certainly not the most likely.
Daniel R. DePetris is a member of Defense Priorities.
